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The EU’s proposed banking union is seen by many as the first step towards
resolving the eurocrisis, and under current proposals, by 2014 the European
Central Bank (ECB) will be responsible for supervising over 6,000 banks in
Europe. Kern Alexander has serious concerns about the accountability and
capacity of the ECB in this potential role, and argues that its primary focus of
maintaining price stability in the eurozone through monetary policy is very different
to that of banking supervision. In order for them to be effective, the proposals must be
strengthened with greater mechanisms to ensure that the ECB is adequately accountable for its
supervisory decisions.
In June 2012, as Spanish authorit ies desperately negot iated with the European Commission
over the terms of  an EU bailout  for the Spanish banking system, the European Union President,
Herman Van Rompuy, issued a paper calling for a European Banking Union that would sever the
vicious link between banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis. The Van Rompuy paper proposed
vast new powers for the European Central Bank (ECB) to supervise over 6,000 banks in the
eurozone and to establish an EU-wide deposit  guarantee scheme, along with creat ing an EU-
wide bank resolut ion fund that would administer failing banks without imposing direct  costs on
taxpayers. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel welcomed the proposals as an important
step in obtaining German support  for allowing the eurozone bailout  fund – the European
Stability Mechanism – to recapitalise ailing eurozone banks. European Council Ministers then
issued a decision support ing the Van Rompuy proposal, and on 12 September the European
Commission proposed a regulat ion that would provide the European Central Bank with banking
supervision powers and another regulat ion to enable the ECB to interact  with the European
Banking Authority in execut ing its supervisory powers.
The ECB’s supervisory powers would be phased-in between January 2013 and January 2014
with the creat ion of  a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that would have an execut ive board
– a Single Supervisory Board (SSB) – which would init ially oversee eurozone banks that have
accepted bailouts. On 1 July 2013, the ECB/SSB would gain supervisory oversight of  the largest
cross-border credit  inst itut ions and f inancial holding companies, and on 1 January 2014 its
authority would extend to an est imated 6,000 banking inst itut ions across the euro area. The
ECB/SSB will be primarily responsible for licensing, monitoring and enforcing prudent ial
regulat ions, such as capital adequacy requirements, liquidity buffers and leverage limits, against
banks based in the eurozone. The ECB/SSB will also be empowered to approve bank recovery
plans and asset t ransfers between af f iliates within banking groups or mixed f inancial
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plans and asset t ransfers between af f iliates within banking groups or mixed f inancial
conglomerates.
These proposals represent a dramat ic inst itut ional
restructuring of  eurozone and EU banking supervision
and will have important implicat ions for the pract ice of
banking supervision in all EU states. They are primarily
designed to sever the link between banking fragility
and over-indebted sovereigns by authorising the
European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise ailing
euro area banks on the condit ion that these banks
are subject  to strict  ECB supervision and
condit ionality. The UK government have tentat ively
supported the proposals, but on the condit ion that
they do not result  in limitat ions on market access for
UK banks and f inancial f irms in the eurozone. These
sweeping new proposed powers for the ECB raise
serious concerns about accountability and
inst itut ional capacity to carry out these funct ions.
The EU Treaty establishes in Art icle 130 a strong form
of independence for the ECB in deciding what
measures it  should use to conduct monetary policy
and to achieve its primary object ive of  price stability. Indeed, the ECB’s independence is widely
considered to be why it  has been viewed as a strong and credible inst itut ion in managing the
value of  the euro and maintaining price stability. It  is unsurprising therefore why some would
advocate that this credibility be extended in the form of banking supervision powers.
Nevertheless, it  should be pointed out that  monetary policy and banking supervision are very
dif ferent. Monetary policy usually involves the use of  a few macro instruments – i.e., interest
rates and the quant ity of  money – to achieve price stability, a measurable object ive of ten
def ined as keeping inf lat ion within a range or below a target rate, and involving a more-or-less
predictable t rade-of f  between inf lat ion and unemployment. Strong legal guarantees of  central
bank independence have been considered necessary in fulf illing the price stability mandate.
Banking supervision, on the other hand, has a wider number of  – of ten conf lict ing – object ives:
f inancial stability, investor and depositor protect ion, consumer protect ion and tackling f inancial
crime. Moreover, it  is much more dif f icult  to measure whether these object ives have been met
and what the economic t rade-of fs are in achieving them. Also, bank supervisors have the
power to restrict  and restructure property and contractual rights – belonging to individual f irms,
depositors, shareholders and creditors – and in doing so to ut ilise a far greater number of
regulatory instruments than is available in monetary policy.
Banking supervision has been subjected to greater accountability mechanisms by allowing, for
example, that  f irms and individuals be consulted before they are subjected to controls and that
the content of  regulat ions are clearly ascertainable in advance and proport ionate to achieve a
legit imate regulatory aim and can be challenged by those subject  to them before a fair and
impart ial t ribunal. Unlike monetary policy, banking supervision requires dif ferent inst itut ional
mechanisms to ensure a more equal balance between the independence and accountability of
the bank supervisor. The ECB’s strong form of independence – as established by the Treaty –
is inappropriate as a policy matter for a modern bank supervisor, and without adequate
accountability mechanisms would likely contravene the legal principle of  the rule of  law.
Moreover, the exercise of  macro-supervision and regulat ion will require the ECB/SSM to take
decisions that may impinge on member states’ economic policies and af fect  economic policy
management by other EU inst itut ions, such as the Parliament, Council and Commission. For
example, if  the ECB/SSB were to decide to impose countercyclical capital requirements or loan
to value or loan to income limits, it  would have a direct  ef fect  on the terms of  f inancial
contracts used on a daily basis by consumers and businesses. The exercise of  these powers
would raise quest ions regarding the ECB’s accountability for these decisions to member states
and EU inst itut ions. The ECB’s limited form of accountability – present ly only being required to
give oral evidence to the European Parliament to explain its policies – in terms of  its
governance structure to other EU inst itut ions and to member states would be inadequate for
the exercise of  bank supervision powers.
The proposals also do not address the ECB’s inst itut ional limitat ions as a bank supervisor. In an
era where global f inancial policymakers have accepted the importance of  macro-prudent ial
regulat ion as extending from licensing to resolut ion, it  is striking that the proposal for an
ECB/SSM only provides ex ante prudent ial supervisory powers for the ECB, without any
ment ion of  bank resolut ion powers. Most regulators now agree that ef fect ive regulat ion
requires a seamless process from crisis prevent ion through crisis management, but under the
proposals the ECB would not be authorised to engage in crisis management, nor would it  be
permit ted to resolve a too-big-to-fail bank, or to use public funds to f inance a bank bail-out .
Under these proposals, the ECB’s ult imate ef fect iveness can be called into quest ion.
Is it  really realist ic to give the ECB ex ante responsibilit ies for micro and macro-prudent ial
supervision while not having the authority to resolve, bail-out , nat ionalise or unwind a large
cross-border bank or to engage in other types of  f inancial rescue? The necessary link between
crisis prevent ion and crisis management is ignored in these proposals and without adequate
recognit ion of  the ECB’s role in bank resolut ion, the proposed regulat ions are dest ined to fail
to achieve their object ive of  controlling systemic risk and enhancing macro-prudent ial
regulat ion in the euro area. In addit ion, the ECB becoming a bank supervisor might bring it  into
conf lict  with its main object ive of  price stability. According to this view, the ECB might be
tempted to lower interest  rates or to loosen condit ions for bank access to liquidity in order to
stabilise the banking sector, but  this might lead to easier terms of  credit  thereby interfering with
its price stability object ive. However, the proposed regulat ion at tempts to address this potent ial
conf lict  by requiring that bank supervision decisions and monetary policy be strict ly separated,
but both are ult imately accountable to the ECB’s Governing Council.
The Commission’s proposals do not provide the necessary inst itut ional mechanisms to ensure
that the ECB/SSM is adequately accountable for its supervisory decisions to those subject  to
its controls and to other EU inst itut ions and member states. This can be at t ributed to the
ECB’s strong form of independence that is set  forth in the Treaty. This is part icularly
problemat ic given the ant icipated broad range of  powers that the ECB is expected to exercise
as a macro-prudent ial supervisor that  will likely have a direct  impact on economic policy.
Furthermore, the proposals do not address the inst itut ional limitat ions that could potent ially
restrict  the ECB’s legal authority under the Treaty to engage in macro-prudent ial supervision,
nor do they st ipulate how the ECB would interact  with member state authorit ies with respect to
bank resolut ion. These outstanding issues suggest that  cont inued work on a European
Banking Union is needed in order to design a more accountable and ef fect ive inst itut ional
f ramework that can better achieve regulatory object ives.
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